The Causes of Revolutions: A comparison between two approaches By: Mahra Salim Alqassimi 20 September 2010 Revolution could
be defined as a forcible sudden change in political and social structure of
society. There have been revolutions as long as there have been systems
against which to rebel, and the subject has interested historians from
earlier times. Recent works on
revolution, however, employ a theoretical rather than a historical approach.
Contemporary investigators tend to deal with revolution generally and through
examination of selected examples seek to develop a general statement capable
to explain the nature and the occurrence of all revolutionary movements
(Lipsky, 1976, p.495). The causes of
revolution have been a central issue in most revolutionary studies. but,
evidently, any theory of revolutionary causation depends ultimately upon its
author’s perception of the nature of revolution itself. Sociologists look to
revolution from different angles: one sociological approach to revolution is
structural approach. Structural analysts emphasize objective relationships
and conflicts between different groups and nations. Their analysis combines a
concern for the power of state with a focus on large scale social
relationships that may reinforce of limit state power – relationships between
states and elite groups, between peasants and landlords,
etc.(Goldstone,1980,p.58). The
psychologists concern themselves primarily with the intentions of the
revolutionary participants and the motivation for their action. They employ
psychological explanations and tend to see revolution primarily as a product
of idealism and personality .(Lipsky, op.cit.,p.498). In this essay I
shall present, discuss, and compare, the approaches of both structuralists
and psychologists. Theta Skocpol and Barrington Moore are representatives in
this essay, of the former group while Ted Gurr and James Davies represent the
psychologists. Although Theda
Skocpol and Barrington Moore approaches to revolution are the same, their
models on the subject and the implications of those models are at variance. Skocpol examined
the causes and consequences of the world’s three major revolutions. in France
in 1789, in Russia in 1917 and in China in 1949. She initially examined the
period on the eve of revolution and traced the roots of crisis and conflicts.
Special emphasis was stressed upon the ways in which those regime states came
into crisis, and also upon the phenomenon of peasant uprisings. The period
from the beginning of the peasant uprising through to the consolidation of
new regimes was also investigated. Here special attention was given to the
state-building efforts of the new leader and to the structures and activities
of new state organizations within revolutionized societies. (Skocpol, 1979,
p.xi). On the basis of
the three above –studied cases, Skocpol develops a general structural model,
what she calls a “structural perspective’. Her analysis involves relationship
among classes, among states and between classes and states. She also examined
each of these three cases within a comparative framework, noting, on one
hand, their similarities with each other and, on the other hand, their
differences from selected cases of non-revolutionary change or failed
revolutionary attempts. (Himmelstein, 1981, p. 1146). In the current
analysis, Skocpol paid little attention to the ideologies or interests of the
participants in the revolution. In the above
analysis, Skocpol distinguished between rebellions, revolts, political
revolutions and social revolutions in those social revolutions require a
successful transformation not only in the policy but also of the social basis
of the political power (ibid, p .1145) Skocpol emerged from her analysis
with three major principles: First she
asserts that revolutions are not made; they happen. They arise from certain
structural conditions – a political –military state crisis in conjunction
with certain relationships between peasantry and landed upper-class and
between landed upper-class and the state (Himmelstein, op.cit. pp1148-1149). Skocpol’s second
major principle is that revolutions do not arise simply from contradictions
and conflict internal to society. She argues that underlying all social is
the “internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development and
nation stats formations”. Revolutions, she argued, occur only in countries
situated in disadvantaged positions within international position within
international arenas (Skocpol, op.cit. p.19.23). The third and
final major principle in Skocpol’s theory is that revolution begin with breakdown of state apparatus which is
shaped not by class struggle but by relations between the state and both the
dominant class and other states. State appears as the main figure in
Skocpol’s account of revolution. She views states as administrative, coercive
organizations that are potentially autonomous from (though conditioned by)
socio-economic interests and social structure (ibid, p. 14). There are two
points detected by many investigators in Skocpol’s overall analysis. First,
she ruled out any substantial role to ‘vanguard parties ‘in making socialist
revolutions. Instead, she found ‘marginal élites’ struggling for state power.
She argued that those ‘marginal elites ‘might have mobilized particular
social classes, but they were not inherently the representatives or partisans
of those classes. (Himmelstein, op. cit., p. 1152). The second point
is that Skocpol does not think that the socialist revolutions that occurred
in the agrarian – bureaucratic societies of Russia and China represent
analogies and models for future social revolutions in advanced capitalist
states. The reasons she gave were that advanced capitalist states are hardly
in a disadvantaged position in international and political arenas. She also
maintains that advanced capitalist societies lack any producing class with
economic and political autonomy of the Russian and Chinese peasantries.
moreover, she argued, previous social revolutions resulted in the rise of
strong, bureaucratic, centralized states, thus, they could not provide a
model for transformation of the strong, bureaucratic, centralized states
already existing in advanced capitalist societies (ibid , pp. 1152-1153). Barrington Moore
is another structural analyst whose approach is that of a comparative,
historical sociology that seeks clues to the present in the past and, in
doing that, employs a wide range of historical material (Rothmans,1970, p.
61). In his book
“social origins of democracy and dictatorship”, moors studied some Western
and Asian societies. His western case studies were confined to England,
France, and United States of America, with briefer scattered references to
both Germany and Russia. in Asia, he studied Japanese, Chinese and Indian
societies, Moore could not deal with every country in the world, and
nevertheless, he tried to formulate a general theory of social change which
is central in his analysis. In his book, he also analysed, in detail, the
causes and consequences of the English revolution in the mid-seventeenth
century, the French revolution in the end of the eighteenth century and
Chinese revolution in the mid twentieth century. In his analysis he gave
particular attention to the mode of production, production relationships and
competing social classes. He paid little attention to the sociological
factors and cultural variables of those societies. (Rothmans, op.cit.
pp.62-63). It might be
not clear that Moors has
developed a general theory of revolution, but from his theory of social
change and his scattered analyses of past revolutions, one could elicit
general principles that are in line with his theory of social causation. Moor argues that
the mode of production in a given society determines ideology of the social
classes of which it is composed and its structure, and that all ruling
classes have, as their primary goal the fullest possible exploitation of
those whom they dominate and
that past revolutions have been inevitable, because the ruling classes have
as their primary goal the fullest possible exploitation of those whom they
dominate and that past
revolutions have been inevitable, because the ruling classes where unable to
transcend their ideologies and unwilling to accept limitations upon their
opportunities for exploitation(ibid, p. 62) Moore also maintains that
whatever the outcome of the revolution it is necessary, even in the radical
phases, for it to produce a society
superior so far to the old regime (ibid,p. 73) It was not of
major importance to Moore that a certain exploited class should launch the
revelation, so far as the result of that revolution help establish and
advanced system and society that serve that class’s interests (ibid, p.70) . In contrast to
Skocpol’s theory on revolution, Moore seems to have concentrated solely on
class conflict as a key to his analysis, while Skocpol also adds
international pressure and external war in her analysis. He also differs from
Skocpol that he looks at the exploitive upper-class and state as inseparable
identities. Aggregate
psychological theories, however, view the causes of revolutions differently.
Instead of analyzing social structures and interrelationships between
different groups in society, they try to explain revolutions in terms of
people psychological motivations for engaging in political violence or
joining oppositional movements( Skocpol, op, cit. 9). Ted Gurr studied
selected cases of violence from historical records and contemporary modern
world. Using critical
variables and indicators such as economic stress, religious cleavages and
other macro-social indicators, he examined political, economic opportunities
to those ethnic or economic groups involved in violent acts (Goldstone, op. cit. pp430-431). At the same
time, he examined these groups’ values, norms, situations and the patterned
forms of action by which those groups organized (Tilly nd Gurr, 1973, p.362).
Then he
distinguished a number of aspects and dimensions of change in those groups,
such as type, extent, scope, pattern and rate of changes (ibid p.363). Analysing the
obtained data, Gurr noticed that before the outbreak of violence, value
changes of substantial extent and scope occur in a society at a pace too
rapid for a commensurate change in institution. People can no longer achieve
any of their goals (relative deprivation), the result is widespread stress. A
period of ‘milling’ and agitation sets in, leading towards consensus of
grievances and the development
of anti-elite norms and ‘solidified public opinion’ develops.
Governments prove incompetent or recalcitrant to remedy the situation and
whenever further institutional or situational change weakens the ability of
the ruling elite to resist, some precipitants will spark revolutionary
conflict ( ibid, p.363). In brief, the
primary causal consequence in revolutionary act is first; the development of
discontent, the politicization of that discontent, and finally its
actualization in violent action against political objects and actors
(Skocpol, op.cit., pp25-26) . In his analysis,
Gurr distinguishes ‘turmoil’, ‘conspiracy’ and ‘internal war‘ as the major
forms of political violence. Revolutions are included in the ‘internal- war
category’, along with large- scale terrorism, guerrilla wars and civil wars.
What sets internal wars apart from the other forms is that they are more
organized than ‘turmoil ‘and more mass-based than conspiracy. Gurr believes
that governmental power and stability depend directly upon societal trends
and popular support. He does not believe that state coercive organizations
can effectively repress (for long) discounted or disapproving majorities of
people in society. The state in his theories, in contrast to Moore, is an
aspect of utilitarian consensus in society. The state can wield force in the
name of popular consensus and legitimacy, but it is not fundamentally founded
in organized coercion (ibid, pp.25-26). Gurr believes that by a prompt action
towards reform, the state could manipulate the level of the critical variable
and could still forestall a full-fledged. (Goldstone, op.cit, p.430). The summary of
Gurr’s argument is as follows: Revolutions are explained as basically due to
the occurrence in a society of widespread intense, or multifaceted relative
deprivation that touches both masses and elite aspirants. Broad participation
in, and a deliberate organization of, political violence are probable unless
the state interfere at the right time and implement reformatory measures. James Davies is
another theorist who believes that subjective attitudes, not objective
conditions, ultimately lead to revolution. He studied a wide range of pre and
proto-revolutionary societies. His main concern was to examine socio-economic
development of these societies before and during revolutionary periods.
Particular attention was given to the needs of the people during those
periods. Expectations of the people and reality were used as two variables to
measure the degree of frustration of the people before involving themselves
in revolutionary acts. Davies agrees
that fundamental impetus towards a revolutionary situation is generated by
rapid economic growth but he associates such growth with a generally rising
rather than a generally falling standard of living. He argues that the moment
of potential revolution is reached only when the long-term phase of growth is
followed by a short-term phase of economic stagnation or decline. The result
of this (j-curve) as he calls it, is that steadily soaring expectation, newly
created by the period of growth, shoot further and further ahead of actual
satisfaction of needs. Successful revolutions, according to Davies, is the
work neither of the destitute nor of the well-satisfied, but of those whose
actual situation is improving less rapidly than they expect, (Stone, 1966,
p.171). This analysis is not only confined to economic factors alone, but
also to other needs like political authority, prestige, etc.(Kumer, p.45). The above
hypothesis on revolution gains an admirable measure of support from past
European Revolutions. Revolutions broke out all over Europe in 1640s, a
decade or two after a long phase of economic growth had come to an end. The
French revolution of 1789 occurred a decade after a period of economic
improvement had given way to an economic recession and two years after that
recession had deteriorated into
crises, it also followed close on the heels of the monarchy failure to
overcome aristocratic opposition ( ibid, p.45). However, both approaches have
encountered many crises To summarize the
argument so far, both Skocpol and Moore believe that only by analysing
relationships between groups and between groups and states, a general theory
of revolution (Skocpol) or social change in general including revolution
(Moore) is possible. Skocpol adds two other factors: international pressure
and state crises and excluded a major role for elites in the revolutionary
process. The
psychologist, on the other hand, believes that relative depravation (Gurr)
and frustration (Davies) of revolutionary participants are the major factors
in revolution. The
structuralist devoted scant space to the process of revolution, to how human
being actually make a revolution. This omission is particularly marked in
Skocpol’s argument who insists on a structural perspective with no admixture
of voluntarism. Skocpol ignored human beings, thinking and acting, which are
the mediating link between structural conditions and social outcomes.
Moreover, structural conditions do not dictate absolutely what humans do,
they merely place certain limits on human action or define a certain range of
possibilities (Himmelstein, op, cit, p. 1153). Structural
conditions may define the possibilities for mass uprisings or the options available
for consolidating state power in a revolutionary situation, but they do not
fully explain how particular groups actually act, what options they pursue,
or what possibilities they realize (ibid, 1153). This gap in
structural analysis seems to have been partially filled by the psychologists
who busy themselves studying the mental states of the revolutionary
participant, their expectations, frustrations and actions. But this
approach is not without its flaws. The psychologist does not discuss clearly
who develops these actions, why they and not others develop them, and why
specific actions are taken because of them (Lipsky, 197). Moreover, the
pattern of events taken as possible initiating causes is vague. Undoubtedly
any kind of social change may give rises to a potentially revolutionary
situation. Since the range of occurrences cited as possible initiators of
potentially revolutionary situations is loosely and broadly specified, the
explanatory power of these analyses is correspondingly weak (Goldstone, p.
430-431).The critical variables themselves, used by Davies and Gurr, are
extremely difficult to observe in practice, because one cannot readily
measure either the cognitive state of mind of large masses of individuals. In conclusion,
it is evident from the above argument, that the theories of revolution are
rather complicated multidimensional issue. There are many aspects of
revolutionary process that the above discussed theorists did not touch. I think only by contribution
and coordination with various other investigators a plausible general theory
of revolution could be established.
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